230 results about "Binary translation" patented technology

Mechanisms have been developed for securing computational systems against certain forms of attack. In particular, it has been discovered that, by maintaining and propagating taint status for memory locations in correspondence with information flows of instructions executed by a computing system, it is possible to provide a security response if and when a control transfer (or other restricted use) is attempted based on tainted data. In some embodiments, memory management facilities and related exception handlers can be exploited to facilitate taint status propagation and / or security responses. Taint tracking through registers of a processor (or through other storage for which access is not conveniently mediated using a memory management facility) may be provided using an instrumented execution mode of operation. For example, the instrumented mode may be triggered by an attempt to propagate tainted information to a register. In some embodiments, an instrumented mode of operation may be more generally employed. For example, data received from an untrusted source or via an untrusted path is often transferred into a memory buffer for processing by a particular service, routine, process, thread or other computational unit. Code that implements the computational unit may be selectively executed in an instrumented mode that facilitates taint tracking. In general, instrumented execution modes may be supported using a variety of techniques including a binary translation (or rewriting) mode, just-in-time (JIT) compilation / re-compilation, interpreted mode execution, etc. Using an instrumented execution mode and / or exception handler techniques, modifications to CPU hardware can be avoided if desirable.

A JIT binary translator translates code at a function level of the source code rather than at an opcode level. The JIT binary translator of the invention grabs an entire x86 function out of the source stream, rather than an instruction, translates the whole function into an equivalent function of the target processor, and executes that function all at once before returning to the source stream, thereby reducing context switching. Also, since the JIT binary translator sees the entire source code function context at once the software emulator may optimize the code translation. For example, the JIT binary translator might decide to translate a sequence of x86 instructions into an efficient PPC equivalent sequence. Many such optimizations result in a tighter emulated binary.

A sequence of input language (IL) instructions of a guest system is converted, for example by binary translation, into a corresponding sequence of output language (OL) instructions of a host system, which executes the OL instructions. In order to determine the return address after any IL call to a subroutine at a target entry address P, the corresponding OL return address is stored in an array at a location determined by an index calculated as a function of P. After completion of execution of the OL translation of the IL subroutine, execution is transferred to the address stored in the array at the location where the OL return address was previously stored. A confirm instruction block is included in each OL call site to determine whether the transfer was to the correct or incorrect call site, and a back-up routine is included to handle the cases of incorrect call sites.

A JIT binary translator examines code to determine if a conversion from big-endian to little-endian can be omitted. For example, the conversion may be omitted when data is merely being loaded and stored. The conversion from big-endian to little-endian may also be omitted when storing certain constructs and numbers. A third example is loading of floating point values. If a conversion from big-endian to little-endian is performed, this could result in four instructions in PowerPC, seven if double precision. However, if floating point values are access consistently as big-endian, the result is only one PowerPC instruction. Optimizations, such as these result in a tighter emulated binary.

Guests, such as virtual machines, that are running on a host hardware platform are selectively descheduled when an idling condition is detected. An example of the idling condition is that the guest has been executing instructions in an idle loop for more than a threshold period. Guest instructions may be evaluated for the idling condition in conjunction with binary translation.

A first software entity occupies a portion of a linear address space of a second software entity and prevents the second software entity from accessing the memory of the first software entity. For example, in one embodiment of the invention, the first software entity is a virtual machine monitor (VMM), which supports a virtual machine (VM), the second software entity. The VMM sometimes directly executes guest instructions from the VM and, at other times, the VMM executes binary translated instructions derived from guest instructions. When executing binary translated instructions, the VMM uses memory segmentation to protect its memory. When directly executing guest instructions, the VMM may use either memory segmentation or a memory paging mechanism to protect its memory. When the memory paging mechanism is active during direct execution, the protection from the memory segmentation mechanism may be selectively deactivated to improve the efficiency of the virtual computer system.