52 results about "Trusted components" patented technology

An untrusted component exposing a high level storage object interface within an untrusted client virtual machine accepts application level storage object operations. Responsive to a storage object operation, the untrusted component passes a message through the underlying hypervisor to an associated trusted component. The trusted component processes the message by authenticating the client virtual machine and locating an internal mapping between the client virtual machine and an associated customer-specific set of backend storage resources to which the requested storage object operation is to be applied. The trusted component uses a trust relationship with the backend storage system to securely communicate the storage object operation to the backend storage system, and passes the operation results through the hypervisor back to the untrusted component in the source client virtual machine from which the storage object request originated.

A computing entity comprises a trusted monitoring component having a first processing means and a first memory means, the trusted monitoring component being a self-contained autonomous data processing unit, and a computer platform having a main processing means and a main memory area, along with a plurality of associated physical and logical resources such as peripheral devices including printers, modems, application programs, operating systems and the like. The computer platform is capable of entering a plurality of different states of operation, each state of operation having a different level of security and trustworthiness. Selected ones of the states comprise trusted states in which a user can enter sensitive confidential information with a high degree of certainty that the computer platform has not been compromised by external influences such as viruses, hackers or hostile attacks. To enter a trusted state, references made automatically to the trusted component, and to exit a trusted state reference must be made to the trusted component. On exiting the trusted state, all references to the trusted state are deleted from the computer platform. On entering the trusted state, the state is entered in a reproducible and known manner, having a reproducible and known configuration which is confirmed by the trusted component.

There is disclosed a computer entity having a trusted component which compiles an event log for events occurring on a computer platform. The event log contains event data of types which are pre-specified by a user by inputting details through a dialogue display generated by the trusted component. Items which can be monitored include data files, applications drivers and the like. The trusted component operates through a monitoring agent which may be launched onto the computer platform. The monitoring agent may be periodically interrogated to make sure that it is operating correctly and responding to interrogations by the trusted component.

A method of security monitoring of data files in a computer platform is carried out by a trusted component having a processor and trusted memory area. The method comprises creating one or a plurality of data files in an untrusted memory area of said computing platform, for each created data file, periodically generating a digest data by applying a hash function to each data file, storing the digest data in a trusted memory area and for each file periodically comparing a current digest data of the file with a previously generated digest data of the file. Any differences between a previous and a current digest data indicate that a file in the untrusted memory area has been corrupted.

Techniques for managing and protecting computing environments are disclosed. A safe computing environment can be provided for ensuring the safety and / or management of a device. The safe computing environment can be secured by a safe component that isolates and protects it from unsafe computing environments which may also be operating. As a result, various security and management activities can be securely performed from a safe computing environment. A safe computing environment can, for example, be provided on a device as a safe virtual computing environment (e.g., a safe virtual machine) protected by a safe virtual computing monitor (e.g., a safe virtual machine monitor) from one or more other virtual computing environments that are not known or not believed to be safe for the device. It will also be appreciated that the safe components can, for example, be provided as trusted components for a device. As such, various trusted components (or agent) can operate in a trusted computing environment secured from interference by components that many not be trusted and perform various security and / or management tasks alone or in connection, for example, with other trusted components (e.g., trusted serves).

A method for authenticating, by a trusted component, a user of a desktop appliance to a remote machine includes executing, by a desktop appliance, a user interaction component, responsive to receiving a secure attention sequence from a user. The user interaction component receives authentication credentials associated with the user. The desktop appliance transmits, to a broker service, the received authentication credentials. The broker service authenticates the user, responsive to the received authentication credentials. The broker service transmits, to a remote machine, authentication data associated with the received authentication credentials. The remote machine authenticates the user, responsive to the received authentication data. The remote machine provides, to the desktop appliance, access to a resource requested by the user. In another aspect, a trusted component provides, to a user of a desktop appliance, access to secure desktop functionality provided by a remote machine.

A first trusted component on a first computing device performs cryptography, evaluation, and enforcement and is tied thereto, and a first user-machine certificate associated with the first computing device is tied to a user. Correspondingly, a second trusted component on a second computing device performs cryptography, evaluation, and enforcement and is tied thereto, and a second user-machine certificate associated with the second computing device is also tied to the user. The first trusted component obtains the content for rendering on the first computing device by way of the first user-machine certificate and the license, and the second trusted component obtains the content for rendering on the second computing device by way of the second user-machine certificate and the same license.

A method, computer program product, and distributed data processing system that allows a system image within a multiple system image virtual server to directly expose a portion, or all, of its associated system memory to a shared PCI adapter without having to go through a trusted component, such as a Hypervisor. Specifically, the present invention is directed to a mechanism for sharing conventional PCI I / O adapters, PCI-X I / O Adapters, PCI-Express I / O Adapters, and, in general, any I / O adapter that uses a memory mapped I / O interface for communications.

A device may include a trusted component. The trusted component may be verified by a trusted third party and may have a certificate of verification stored therein based on the verification by the trusted third party. The trusted component may include a root of trust that may provide secure code and data storage and secure application execution. The root of trust may also be configured to verify an integrity of the trusted component via a secure boot and to prevent access to the certain information in the device if the integrity of the trusted component may not be verified.

An application includes a plurality of features. A transaction is engaged with a retailer to obtain a product license corresponding to the application. The product license defines at least one feature of the application that may be employed. A base copy of the application is obtained from a distributor and is actuated. A use license corresponding to the product license is acquired from a licensor by way of the actuated application sending the product license to the licensor along with an identification of at least one of a user, the computing device, and a trusted component operating on the computing device, where the use license includes feature policy granting rights to employ each feature defined in the product license.

A method describes user interaction in combination with sending a send item from an application of a computing device to a recipient. The computing device has an attestation unit thereon for attesting to trustworthiness. The application facilitates a user in constructing the send item, and pre-determined indicia are monitored that can be employed to detect that the user is in fact expending effort to construct the send item. The attestation unit authenticates the application to impart trust thereto, and upon the user commanding the application to send, a send attestation is constructed to accompany the send item. The send attestation is based on the monitored indicia and the authentication of the application and thereby describes the user interaction. The constructed send attestation is packaged with the constructed send item and the package is sent to the recipient.

In a data network congestion control in a virtualized environment is enforced in packet flows to and from virtual machines in a host. A hypervisor and network interface hardware in the host are trusted components. Enforcement comprises estimating congestion states in the data network attributable to respective packet flows, recognizing a new packet that belongs to one of the data packet flows, and using one or more of the trusted components and to make a determination based on the congestion states that the new packet belongs to a congestion-producing packet flow. A congestion-control policy is applied by one or more of the trusted components to the new packet responsively to the determination.

A system and method for signing and authenticating electronic documents using public key cryptography applied by one or more server computer clusters operated in a trustworthy manner, which may act in cooperation with trusted components controlled and operated by the signer. The system employs a presentation authority for presenting an unsigned copy of an electronic document to a signing party and a signature authority for controlling a process for affixing an electronic signature to the unsigned document to create a signed electronic document. The system provides an applet for a signing party's computer that communicates with the signature authority.

A system debugs a computer application that employs rights-managed (RM) content. A first, non-isolated process has the application and a shell version of the trusted component, where such shell version receives each request by the application for RM services. The shell version is unconcerned whether a debugger is monitoring the first process. A second, isolated process is separate from the first process and has a debugging version of the trusted component. The shell version in the first process forwards the received request to the debugging version in the second process, and such debugging version acts upon same. The debugging version ensures that the debugger is not monitoring the second process, but is unconcerned whether the debugger is monitoring the first process.

A trusted component on a device includes a secure HWID therein and is verified by obtaining a key from the device, and verifying each signed component of the operating system of the device therewith. A driver table is examined to locate a HWID driver which is verified as containing a pointer back to an address inside a kernel. The verified operating system is called to obtain the secure HWID from a HWID component by way of the HWID driver and to return same to the trusted component. Thereafter, the returned HWID is verified as matching the HWID included with the trusted component.

To install a black box on a computing device, an administrator has access to the computing device and queries same for machine properties thereof. The administrator sends the machine properties of the computing device to a black box server as part of a request for a new black box for the computing device. The black box server in response constructs the new black box based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the new black box to the computing device, and delivers the new black box to the administrator. The administrator thereafter installs the new black box on the computing device. The administrator may include an activation provider running on the computing device and an activation manager in communication with the activation provider. The administrator may also deactivate the black box if it determines that the black box is no longer trustworthy.

A method for modifying a trusted information handling system (IHS) is disclosed that includes providing a trusted component (TC) on the IHS and providing at least one third party TC on the IHS. A trusted IHS is disclosed that includes a processor in data communication with memory, a user TC on the trusted IHS for receiving user data establishing a user foundation of trust (FOT) and at least one third party TC on the trusted IHS for establishing a third party FOT.

Security can be enforced in a consistent manner with respect to various computing environments that may be operable in a computing system. Consistent security criteria can be generated, based on input security criterion, in a computer readable and storable form and stored in a computer readable storage medium, thereby allowing the consistent security criterion to be effectively provided to a computing system for enforcement of the input security criterion in a consistent manner with respect to, for example, (a) a first executable computer code effectively supported by an Operating System (OS), and (b) a second computer code effectively supported by the Virtual Computing Environment (VCE). A Trusted Component (TC) can effectively provide a consistent security criterion as a part and / or form that is suitable for a particular computing environment. The TC can, for example, be an automated tool that performs various functions including: verifying the consistency of security criteria, generation and deployment of consistent security criteria, and transformation of security criteria to parts and / or forms suitable for various computing environments. In addition, a Virtual Computing Environment (VCE) can obtain from the Operating System (OS) one or more security criteria. The Virtual Computing Environment (VCE) can be operable in a Trusted Computing Environment (TCE) and interface with a Trusted Operating System (TOS) that effectively enforces Mandatory Access Control (MAC), thereby allowing the Virtual Computing Environment (VCE) to leverage the security provided by the OS. The OS can, for example, be a Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) Operating System operating as a Trusted Component in a Trusted Environment that includes a Trusted Security Agent (TSA) operable to deploy consistent security criteria.

Sensitive data structures, such as type data structures, can be used by untrusted application programs without necessarily exposing the sensitive data structures directly. For example, untrusted components, such as application programs that may or may not be type safe, can be allowed to operate in a lower-privilege mode. In addition, the application programs can be associated with an address space with limited permissions (e.g., read-only) to a shared memory heap. Requests by the untrusted components for sensitive data structures can then be handled by trusted components operating in a higher-privilege mode, which may have broader permissions to the shared memory heap. If the requests by the untrusted components are deemed to be valid, the results of the requests can be shared with the lower-privilege mode components through the shared memory heap.

A trusted computing environment 100, wherein each computing device 112 to 118 holds a policy specifying the degree to which it can trust the other devices in the environment 100. The policies are updated by an assessor 110 which receives reports from trusted components 120 in the computing devices 112 to 118 which identify the trustworthiness of the computing devices 112 to 118.

A system debugs a computer application that employs rights-managed (RM) content. A first, non-isolated process has the application and a shell version of the trusted component, where such shell version receives each request by the application for RM services. The shell version is unconcerned whether a debugger is monitoring the first process. A second, isolated process is separate from the first process and has a debugging version of the trusted component. The shell version in the first process forwards the received request to the debugging version in the second process, and such debugging version acts upon same. The debugging version ensures that the debugger is not monitoring the second process, but is unconcerned whether the debugger is monitoring the first process.

A system and method for signing and authenticating electronic documents using public key cryptography applied by one or more server computer clusters operated in a trustworthy manner, which may act in cooperation with trusted components controlled and operated by the signer. The system employs a presentation authority for presenting an unsigned copy of an electronic document to a signing party and a signature authority for controlling a process for affixing an electronic signature to the unsigned document to create a signed electronic document. The system provides an applet for a signing party's computer that communicates with the signature authority.

The embodiment of the invention discloses a data encryption method, system and a terminal. The method comprises the following steps: a trusted component receiving a verification password input in a trusted environment; and if the verification password is successfully verified, performing corresponding operation on the encryption key and the association relationship between the encryption key and the user password based on a preset key management rule and operation information input in the trusted environment, encrypting the data based on the encryption key, and storing the encrypted data. According to the method, the system and the terminal, the user password can be input and verified in the trusted environment, and the password is prevented from being monitored, intercepted and leaked. Data is encrypted and stored in a trusted environment, so that the security is remarkably enhanced. A plurality of different encryption keys can be managed and protected by one password. The encryptionkey is not changed when the password is modified, the target data does not need to be encrypted again, and the security of the data can be ensured.

Techniques for managing and protecting computing environments are disclosed. A safe computing environment can be provided for ensuring the safety and / or management of a device. The safe computing environment can be secured by a safe component that isolates and protects it from unsafe computing environments which may also be operating. As a result, various security and management activities can be securely performed from a safe computing environment. A safe computing environment can, for example, be provided on a device as a safe virtual computing environment (e.g., a safe virtual machine) protected by a safe virtual computing monitor (e.g., a safe virtual machine monitor) from one or more other virtual computing environments that are not known or not believed to be safe for the device. It will also be appreciated that the safe components can, for example, be provided as trusted components for a device. As such, various trusted components (or agent) can operate in a trusted computing environment secured from interference by components that many not be trusted and perform various security and / or management tasks alone or in connection, for example, with other trusted components (e.g., trusted serves).