Card distributing user terminer, paying center, and method and system for protecting repaid card data

Abstract

This invention discloses a method for protecting data of charge cards of a charge center in an intelligent network including: applying an encrypted cryptographic key in the public key system to encrypt information in the charge card data to generate attached verification information and loading recordings of charge cards containing said attached check information, when a user is charged, the intelligent network charge center applies a de-ciphered cryptographic key corresponding to the key to de-cipher the attached verification information corresponding to the charge center. This invention alsodiscloses a data encrypting method, a de-ciphering method to charge card data, a system for protecting the charge card data, a card-issuing customer end and a charge center of an intelligent network.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to a card issuing client, an intelligent network recharge center, a recharge card data encryption method, a recharge card data decryption method, and a method for protecting recharge card data in an intelligent network recharge center A method and a system for protecting recharge card data of an intelligent network recharge center. Background technique [0002] The telecommunications industry widely uses recharge cards to recharge or pay bills for its users. When recharging, the user needs to provide evidence to prove the legitimacy of the recharge card and that he is the real holder of the recharge card, usually by entering the recharge card password printed on the recharge card into the recharge system. The recharge system will inject the amount corresponding to the recharge card into the user's account after verifying that the password provided by the user is correct....

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0013] In the above-mentioned second prior art, it can only realize the protection of the plaintext confidentiality of the recharge card password, and cannot identify the authenticity of the recharge card data, nor can it judge whether the recharge card data is legally loaded into the VC database through the card issuing client.

[0014] In addition, although the second prior art has an additional integrity check on the recharge card amount, unauthorized users who have access to the VC database can modify the amount and then regenerate the amount summary to replace the original amount Summary field, unauthorized users can also replace the recharge card record to be modified with the amount and amount summary of other recharge card records, so real integrity verification cannot be achieved

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