DES masking method for resisting side-channel attack

Abstract

The invention provides a DES masking method capable of resisting side-channel attack technology. The method is implemented by two DESs, wherein one DES is used for data encryption and decryption after masking, and the other DES is used for off-masking value calculation. In the DES implementation process, before an initial IP is replaced, masking is carried out first, and 16 different random numbers are respectively introduced into 16 sub wheels for masking. The correlation between power consumption and operating data is substantially eliminated, and the cost for attackers to attack DES with the use of a side-channel means is greatly increased. Therefore, the method can be widely used in an electronic chip with a DES security calculation module.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a method for safely executing DES cipher algorithm in electronic components, in particular to a method for resisting side-channel attacks when electronic components execute DES algorithm. Background technique [0002] 1. DES Security Vulnerabilities [0003] The simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) proposed by Kocher pose a serious threat to the cipher implemented by the circuit. Then came the use of simple electromagnetic analysis (simple electromagnetic analysis, SEMA), differential electromagnetic attack (differential electromagnetic analysis, DEMA), etc., these attack methods are collectively referred to as side-channel attacks (side-channel attacks, SCA). It has become an important attack method to attack the key by using the side channel information leaked during the execution of the cryptographic algorithm by the circuit module, and this method has the characteristics of low attack cost and ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

For the DES mask, since the IP, E, and P operations are all linear operations, it is easy to use a Boolean mask, but for the S box, it is difficult to remove the mask by using a Boolean mask. The literature [Mehdi-Laurent Akkar, Christophe Giraud.An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks.CHES2001, LNCS2162, p309-318, 2001] mentioned a method of masking the S box, but in fact this S box masking effect is not good, careful analysis, the mask The method does not hide

The literature [F.-X.Standaert, G.Rouvroy, and J.-J.Quisquater.FPGA Implementations of the DES and Triple-DES Masked Against Power Analysis Attacks.in proceedings of FPL2006, August2006, Madrid, Spain] mentioned another A masking method, through precomputation and storage, can effectively realize the mask, but this method only uses a random number for masking, although the relationship between the real intermediate value and the side channel information is weakened, but the middle of multiple rounds The value still leaks some information more or less, and the security strength is slightly weaker. In addition, this document does not clearly give the mask box or the calculation method of the mask box

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