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Attack verification and protection method and device for SM2 signature algorithm

A verification method and verification device technology, which is applied in the direction of secure communication devices, user identity/authority verification, countermeasures against encryption mechanisms, etc., can solve problems that cannot be guessed and attackers do not know, and achieve the effect of improving encryption security

Active Publication Date: 2019-04-09
北京智慧云测科技有限公司 +1
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0024] At this time, k+r is a random number, the attacker does not know it, so it is impossible to guess dA

Method used

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  • Attack verification and protection method and device for SM2 signature algorithm

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Experimental program
Comparison scheme
Effect test

Embodiment 1

[0080] Embodiment 1 of the present invention provides an attack verification method for the SM2 signature algorithm, including the step of: performing an error injection attack on the addition position of the SM2 signature algorithm.

[0081] The error injection attack is carried out at the addition calculation position, the addition is easily skipped, and the value of the register corresponding to the addition result will not change, and it is still the latest value. And this kind of error will not be found, that is, it can pass the verification. This shows that the protected SM2 encryption algorithm in the prior art has security risks.

Embodiment 2

[0083] Embodiment 2 of the present invention provides a preferred embodiment of an attack verification method for the SM2 signature algorithm. see figure 1 As shown, in this embodiment, the attack verification method includes steps:

[0084] S201, measuring the energy trace of the SM2 signature, that is, the power consumption waveform;

[0085] S202, find and calculate the time position of temp1=k+r on the power consumption waveform through SPA analysis;

[0086] S203, perform laser error injection at this time position;

[0087] S204, injecting repeatedly at the same time to obtain wrong data.

[0088] Preliminary analysis of the erroneous data shows that r will have a special fixed value in the obtained erroneous data, and the fixed value is the hash value e of the plaintext required by the SM2 signature, that is, r=e. The formula for calculating r in SM2 is r=x1+e, indicating that the attack causes this addition to be bypassed, and the value of the register storing r ha...

Embodiment 3

[0093] Embodiment 3 of the present invention provides an attack verification device for the SM2 signature algorithm, including an attack module for performing an error injection attack on the addition position of the SM2 signature algorithm.

[0094] As a preferred solution, the attack module includes:

[0095] The measurement unit is used to measure the energy trace of the SM2 signature, that is, the power consumption waveform;

[0096] The analysis unit is used to find the position of the addition process of calculating temp1 on the power consumption waveform through SPA analysis, and record the time point corresponding to the position as the trigger time point;

[0097]The interference unit is used for performing laser injection at the trigger time point to interfere with the addition process; and repeating the laser injection at the trigger time point to obtain wrong data.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an attack verification and protection method and device for an SM2 signature algorithm. According to the attack verification method, an error injection attack is carried out atan addition position of an SM2 signature algorithm, and the protection method protects an addition and subtraction process in which a random number k participates. The attack verification device forthe SM2 signature algorithm comprises an attack module, and a protection device for the SM2 signature algorithm comprises a protection module. The invention discovers that the protection measures in the prior art ignore the protection of the random number k when s is calculated, regardless of the original formula k-r*dA, or a deformed r + k, an addition and subtraction process in which a random number k participates exists. The existing protection technology does not protect this, so that the existing SM2 encryption algorithm has certain risk vulnerabilities, and the protection method providedby the invention can effectively resist corresponding attack means and prevent information leakage.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of computer encryption, in particular to an attack verification and protection method and device for an SM2 signature algorithm. Background technique [0002] In 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller independently proposed the problem of using elliptic curves to design public key cryptosystems. After 1990, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC for short) began to be recognized by the business community, and recognized standardization organizations formulated the Elliptic Curve Cryptography Protocol. Both ECC and RSA depend on the computational difficulty of discrete logarithms (DLP problem for short), let G be a finite ABEL addition group, assume that g is an element of G, a is any integer, if g and ag are known , the problem of how to find the integer a is called the discrete logarithm problem in mathematics. The discrete logarithm problem can be subdivided into two categories, one is the discrete logarithm pro...

Claims

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Application Information

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Patent Type & Authority Applications(China)
IPC IPC(8): H04L9/32H04L9/08H04L9/00H04L29/06
CPCH04L9/003H04L9/004H04L9/0869H04L9/3247H04L9/3252H04L63/1416H04L63/1433
Inventor 李增局王彭彭赵鹏辉董晓婕刘志刚李文宝史汝辉尚现峰李士通王晓磊
Owner 北京智慧云测科技有限公司
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