Security chip-based trusted startup method

Abstract

The invention discloses a security chip-based trusted startup method. The method comprises the steps of dividing a BootLoader into 6 parts; based on digital signatures, making mirror images of the 6 parts; storing the key mirror images in a security chip; loading the mirror images of the 6 parts in sequence; performing completeness verification after the mirror images are loaded; and after the completeness verification is passed, starting a boot process of Linux. Key data is stored by using the security chip on the basis of ensuring the credibility of trusted chain startup by adopting the digital signature and the completeness verification, so that the startup credibility can be effectively improved.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of mobile intelligent terminal security, and more specifically, relates to a trusted startup method based on a security chip. Background technique [0002] The security of hardware structure and operating system is the basis of information system security. At present, for embedded system security problems, the existing solution is to introduce trusted computing technology, the main idea is to establish a root of trust and a chain of trust to ensure the integrity and security of the system. In the embedded system, the existing implementation methods of trusted computing technology are divided into two categories: one is to use the trusted platform module (trusted platform module, referred to as TPM) proposed by the trusted computing organization (trusted computing program, referred to as TCG) Communicate with the embedded CPU. The TPM is used as the root of trust, and the initial expected measurement value ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

This method requires one-time programming of the loaded entities, and cannot achieve normal system updates

At the same time, this method does not take into account the possibility of physical attacks such as scanning physical memory to obtain plaintext, cold start attacks using memory data residues, and microscopes reading internal data of the chip during the boot process.

Finally, neither consider recovery techniques for embedded systems

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