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Auditing a device

a technology of a device and a test tube, applied in the field of auditing a device, can solve the problems of exacerbated situation, device with limited resources, and inability to store definitions of detecting all known programs

Active Publication Date: 2013-01-24
QUALCOMM INC
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  • Summary
  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

AI Technical Summary

Benefits of technology

The patent text describes a system for detecting unauthorized programs on devices. Existing techniques are resource-intensive and require constant updates and scanning for problems. The invention aims to provide a more efficient and effective way of detecting unauthorized programs, while also addressing potential privacy concerns. The technical effects include improved detection of unauthorized programs, reduced resource requirements, and improved privacy protection.

Problems solved by technology

Existing techniques for detecting the presence of unauthorized programs are typically resource-intensive.
The situation is exacerbated if the device being protected by such techniques has limited resources, such as limited memory, or by being powered by a battery.
As one example, a device with limited resources may not be able to store definitions for detecting all known unauthorized programs.
As another example, scanning for unauthorized programs is typically a power-intensive act, and may quickly deplete the battery of a battery-powered device.
One drawback of this approach is that it typically requires that the device being protected compile detailed logs of device activities.
Generating such logs is resource-intensive (e.g., requiring large amounts of disk storage; processing power to assemble the log data; and the bandwidth to deliver the log data to the central authority) and can also present privacy problems.
Existing techniques for detecting the presence of unauthorized programs are also generally vulnerable to attempts by such programs to cause incorrect reporting.
Existing techniques for screening against the installation or execution of unauthorized programs are also known to be vulnerable to new instances of malware that may not immediately be detectable due to a lack of information about their structure and functionality.
Therefore, and irrespective of the resources available to the device, if the unauthorized program is sufficiently sophisticated and / or has not previously been encountered, it can evade detection and cause undetected harm.
And, if the unauthorized program has intentionally been installed by the user to bypass detection (e.g., to facilitate software piracy), traditional techniques may fail to locate the unauthorized program, or any other unauthorized activities.

Method used

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Examples

Experimental program
Comparison scheme
Effect test

example 1

[0256]In some embodiments, only half as much pseudo-random material is generated (as before). Only in even-numbered cells of free RAM is it written and only in these cells will memory-printing be performed later on. This speeds up both the generation phase and the memory-printing by a factor 2. It also avoids having to page out material in RAM, and allows the odd-numbered cells to be used to store temporary values, such as variables needed for the execution of the memory-printing. Malware can exist, but can only jump (to odd cells), nothing else. If it attempts to do anything else, it will have to execute random content stored in the even-numbered cells, which will disrupt the malware execution.

example 2

[0257](a) Obtain the seed to generate the pseudo-random string very early on, and generate this in the background . . . at any time. Call this first pseudo-random generator PRG1. Store this string in secondary storage until it is needed.

[0258](b) To perform the setup before memory-printing, receive a new seed value (call this seed2) and use this as input to a fast pseudo-random generator. Call this second pseudo-random generator PRG2. Combine the output of PRG1 and PRG2 by XORing them together, writing the contents to free RAM. (Note that this can be combined with Example #1.)

[0259]Note: It is possible to use a weak PRG2, since the final randomness will be the combination of the two randomness sources. It can be also be one in accordance with NIST special publication 800-90. A secure block cipher can be converted into a CSPRNG by running it in counter mode. This is done by choosing a random key and encrypting a zero, then encrypting a 1, then encrypting a 2, etc. The counter can als...

example 3

[0262]As with Example 1, only checksum even cells from the cells that were read to the cache. If the location to be read is in the area where the monolith kernel resides, also accumulate the contents of the odd cells that were read. (That can be done after all the even cells have been accumulated, and it need not be done in the order they appear.)

Communication Speeds

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PUM

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Abstract

The auditing of a device that includes a physical memory is disclosed. One or more hardware parameters that correspond to a hardware configuration is received. Initialization information is also received. The physical memory is selectively written in accordance with a function. The physical memory is selectively read and at least one result is determined. The result is provided to a verifier.

Description

CROSS REFERENCE TO OTHER APPLICATIONS[0001]This application is a continuation in part of co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13 / 044,365 entitled AUDITING A DEVICE filed Mar. 9, 2011, which is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13 / 044,365 claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61 / 311,999 entitled AUDITING A DEVICE filed Mar. 9, 2010, which is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes, and is a continuation in part of co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12 / 580,891 entitled AUDITING A DEVICE filed Oct. 16, 2009, which is also incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12 / 580,891 claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 61 / 234,604 entitled DETECTION OF MALWARE filed Aug. 17, 2009 which is incorporated herein, in its entirety, by reference for all purposes.BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION[0002]Existing techniques for detecting the presence of unautho...

Claims

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Application Information

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Patent Type & Authority Applications(United States)
IPC IPC(8): G06F21/00
CPCG06F21/567G06F21/00G06F21/79G06F2221/2101
Inventor JAKOBSSON, BJORN MARKUSJOHANSSON, KARL-ANDERS R.
Owner QUALCOMM INC
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