Reliance management for electronic transaction system

Abstract

A method of managing reliance in an electronic transaction system includes a certification authority issuing a primary certificate to a subscriber and forwarding to a reliance server, information about the issued primary certificate. The reliance server maintains the forwarded information about issued primary certificate. The subscriber forms a transaction and then provides the transaction to a relying party. The transaction includes the primary certificate or a reference thereto. The relying party sends to the reliance server a request for assurance based on the transaction received from the subscriber. The reliance server determines whether to provide the requested assurance based on the information about the issued primary certificate and on the requested assurance. Based on the determining, the reliance server issues to the relying party a secondary certificate providing the assurance to the relying party.

Description

1. Field of the Invention[0001] This invention relates to electronic transactions, and, more particularly, to services supporting reliance on digital signature certificates and managing the risk of such certificates in an electronic transaction system.2. Background of the Invention[0002] Systems for accomplishing business transactions electronically are becoming increasingly widespread, partly because of the advent of global computer networks such as the Internet, and partly because of the evolution and maturity of public key cryptography, which enhances the security of such commerce. The application of public key cryptography to electronic commerce has been heretofore envisioned in documents such as Recommendation X.509 of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU, formerly CCITT) (hereinafter "Standard X.509"), the Digital Signature Guidelines of the American Bar Association's Information Security Committee (December 1995 edition, hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), and statutes ...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

The backdrop established in these and other documents addresses some problems but leaves many of them unsolved and unresolved.

Often, a party's right to rely on a certificate is limited.

Further, reliance on some certificates is specified to be per se unreliable.

In addition, a certificate which has not been accepted by its subscriber or issued by a certification authority should not be considered to have taken effect, and could, perhaps rather loosely, be considered invalid.

Little support for risk management: The conventional system provides very few facilities or opportunities to enable a certification authority to manage the risk of certification.

The certification authority also has no way of monitoring outstanding certificates, ascertaining whether problems arise, evaluating which factors affect the risk of faulty certification or the scope of exposure to risk that the certification authority should prudently undertake.

Furthermore, conventional systems provide few facilities to help subscribers and relying parties manage their risks, including the risk of keeping the private key secure.

Relying party is under-served: To a great extent, it is the relying party, not the subscriber, who bears the risk of fraud or forgery in the transaction.

If a document is forged or is fraudulently altered, the relying party will suffer the consequences, which, according to the law of most states, is that the message is treated as void.

This state of affairs exposes the certification authority to serious liability risks in relation to the relying party and causes the certification authority to forgo the business opportunity of serving the relying party.

Lack of robustness: Because the conventional system fails to address risk management and the needs of relying parties, certification authorities have tended to interpret their roles narrowly.

This mechanical approach to certification limits the potential for CAs to add further value to electronic commerce transactions.

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