Direct energy transaction dynamic contract stimulating method under independent asymmetric information

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of direct energy transactions, and particularly relates to a direct energy transaction dynamic contract stimulating method under independent asymmetric information. The used method comprises the following steps: mapping a direct energy transaction scene into a labor market, applying a market driving-based contract model into an energy transaction stimulating mechanism, and building an electricity consumer and a small-scale electricity supplier model; and in consideration of the selfishness of a small-scale electricity supplier in an energy transaction network and asymmetry of information of two parties, in allusion to a difference between power generation equipment and storage equipment of a small-scale electricity supplier and the possible randomness and intermittency characteristics of renewable energy, realizing discrimination of private information of the SES (Small-scale Electricity Supplier) by designing a dynamic contract model penetrating two stages of energy transactions in combination with individual rationality and stimulation compatible conditions, so as to stimulate the SES to actively participate power transmission and fulfill the aims of transaction benefits and reduction of loss of a power transmission line.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of direct energy transactions, and in particular relates to a dynamic contract incentive method for direct energy transactions under independent asymmetric information. Background technique [0002] Direct energy trading technology is considered a promising approach to improve energy efficiency. By building small wind power generation platforms or solar panels, small-scale electricity suppliers (Small-scale Electricity Supplier, SES) can sell surplus electricity to electricity consumers (Electricity Consumer, EC), which can simultaneously achieve transaction gains and reduce transmission line losses. However, due to the randomness of power resources and the selfishness of SES, potential SES may not be willing to participate in direct energy transactions without any incentive. In addition, various incentive methods require almost complete information to select SES. However, there is an information asymmetry...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

However, most existing techniques only consider static contract design, i.e., the relationship between EC and SES is static in direct energy trading

However, in the actual direct energy transaction, the electricity load of residents and the electricity transmission cost during peak hours change with time, and the static incentive mechanism seems to lack the flexibility of direct energy transaction

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