TPCM system for building and maintaining trusted operating environment and corresponding method

Abstract

The invention relates to a TPCM system for building and maintaining a trusted operating environment. The TPCM system includes a power control unit connected to a power source, a startup code metric module, a platform environment metric module and a dynamic metric module, wherein the power source supplies the power control unit with a standby voltage as an operating voltage of the TPCM system. Thestartup code metric module is connected to a startup code flash memory of a computer main board through a main control bus to control its power supply and is configured that the startup code is read in the startup code flash memory after the TPCM system is powered up, a first hashed value of the startup code is generated and compared with a first reference hashed value, and a power-up signal is sent by the power control unit when the first hashed value and the first reference hashed value are consistent. The invention also relates to a method. The TPCM system for building and maintaining the trusted operating environment can improve the reliability of the trusted platform and reduce the cost while preventing a startup code chip from tampering hardware and preventing the trusted operating environment from being built with the tampered hardware, and can dynamically ensure the trusted operating environment.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention generally relates to the field of information security, and specifically relates to a TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module) system and a corresponding method for building and maintaining a trusted operating environment. Background technique [0002] A trusted platform module (Trusted Platform Module, TPM) is a hardware device, which is connected to a computer motherboard, and is used to verify identity and process variables used by the computer in a trusted computing environment. The TPM and the data stored in it are usually separated from all other components of the computer. [0003] The Trusted Platform Module in the prior art is a separate module controlled by the motherboard, so it cannot guarantee the integrity of the startup code (such as BIOS code) of the motherboard itself. Today, when the boot code of the mainboard is more and more vulnerable to attack and tampering, the traditional TPM can no longer guarantee the cred...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0003] The Trusted Platform Module in the prior art is a separate module controlled by the motherboard, so it cannot guarantee the integrity of the startup code (such as BIOS code) of the motherboard itself

Today, when the boot code of the mainboard is more and more vulnerable to attack and tampering, the traditional TPM can no longer guarantee the credibility of the computer platform.

Unable to provide the ability to monitor the credibility of dynamic systems and protect the credibility of the computer operating environment in real time

[0004] In addition, because most of the trusted platform modules in the prior art do not have boot code-level security verification such as BIOS codes and Android key codes, they cannot well prevent important components such as USB interfaces, hard drives, and memory tampered replacement of

It cannot prevent the use of tampered hardware devices to build a trusted operating environment or dynamically modify the system memory in real time, which will pose a greater threat to the reliability of the hardware and the security of the system

[0005] In addition, in the prior art, software applications such as anti-virus software are generally used to monitor the security of the operating environment and monitor malicious intrusions, but monitoring at the software level requires a large amount of CPU resources for scanning and comparison. Dependence on memory cannot fundamentally prevent virus injection at the hardware platform level

Even if the above shortcomings are ignored, due to the lack of underlying trusted foundation support, the protection software itself is vulnerable to virus attacks and malicious tampering, so such operating environment monitoring methods still cannot satisfactorily guarantee a safe operating environment

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