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Method for correcting intermediate variable calculation result in correlation side channel attack

A side-channel attack and intermediate variable technology, which is applied to the countermeasures of attacking encryption mechanisms, secure communication devices, digital transmission systems, etc., can solve problems such as loss of correlation coefficient attacks

Inactive Publication Date: 2018-03-09
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  • Abstract
  • Description
  • Claims
  • Application Information

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Problems solved by technology

But when the f function is a general function, such as f(x,y)=x+y, at this time due to the simplicity of the operation, the correlation data between the input x and the side channel signal, for the correlation between z and the side channel signal At this time, the generalized correlation coefficient attack cannot use the peak value as the criterion for judging whether the guess is correct, that is, at this time, the correlation coefficient attack loses its effect

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  • Method for correcting intermediate variable calculation result in correlation side channel attack
  • Method for correcting intermediate variable calculation result in correlation side channel attack
  • Method for correcting intermediate variable calculation result in correlation side channel attack

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[0039] Exemplary embodiments of the present invention will now be described with reference to the drawings; however, the present invention may be embodied in many different forms and are not limited to the embodiments described herein, which are provided for the purpose of exhaustively and completely disclosing the present invention. invention and fully convey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art. The terms used in the exemplary embodiments shown in the drawings do not limit the present invention. In the figures, the same units / elements are given the same reference numerals.

[0040] Unless otherwise specified, the terms (including scientific and technical terms) used herein have the commonly understood meanings to those skilled in the art. In addition, it can be understood that terms defined by commonly used dictionaries should be understood to have consistent meanings in the context of their related fields, and should not be understood as idealized or over...

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Abstract

The invention discloses a method for correcting an intermediate variable calculation result in a correlation side channel attack. The method comprises the following steps: generating a correlation coefficient conversion table (the formula is described in the specification) of a sampling function f (x, y); inputting, by an external caller, at least two known and random ciphertext numerical values to form a function known input data array X; obtaining a sampling time array T according to a side channel signal generated by the sampling function (the formula is described in the specification); forming a function secret input data space array Y according to possible values of y, and obtaining a function value space matrix (the formula is described in the specification) of the known input data according to each element of the array X and the array Y in the operation of (the formula is described in the specification); calculating a correlation coefficient r of each column in the matrix (the formula is described in the specification) and the array T to obtain an array R; calculating the correlation coefficient (the formula is described in the specification) of the array X and the array T by using a linear correlation calculating function; obtaining a correlation coefficient array (the formula is described in the specification) corresponding to an array (the formula is described in thespecification) by using the conversion table; and calculating the difference between the array R and the array (the formula is described in the specification) to find a peak so as to determine yj equal to yj.

Description

technical field [0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of encryption and decryption information, and more specifically, relates to a method for correcting calculation results of intermediate variables in correlation side channel attacks. Background technique [0002] During the calculation process, the cryptographic device will release some timing signals in terms of power consumption and electromagnetics. We call these signals side-channel information. Side channel attack is the process of analyzing these side channel information to obtain the internal state of the cryptographic device, and analyze it to obtain the value of the unknown password. Side-channel attacks can be divided into simple side-channel attacks, differential side-channel attacks, template side-channel attacks, and correlation coefficient side-channel attacks according to attack methods. [0003] Correlation coefficient side-channel attacks are mainly based on input data and guessed p...

Claims

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Application Information

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Patent Type & Authority Applications(China)
IPC IPC(8): H04L9/00
CPCH04L9/002
Inventor 华刚
Owner AEROSPACE INFORMATION
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