HTTP safety communication method and system applicable for CDN value added service platform
A value-added service platform and secure communication technology, applied in transmission systems, electrical components, etc., can solve problems such as failure of security defense capabilities, inability to defend against client reverse cracking, and achieve the effect of defending against replay attacks
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Embodiment 1
[0082] Example 1: Normal HTTP request
[0083] 1) The client uses HTTPS to initiate a login request, and the request content is as follows:
[0084] POST / loginHTTP / 1.1
[0085] User-Agent:Test-Client
[0086] Content-Length: 34
[0087] Host:www.cdnvas.com
[0088] {
[0089] username=testusr;
[0090] password=testpwd;
[0091] }
[0092] 2) The value-added service platform dispatch control center checks the account name and password and confirms that it is valid. Use MD5 algorithm to calculate "username_password" to get the user's identity token. MD5(testusr_testpwd)=58d04acca5d09641967d3f28756da156.
[0093] 3) The value-added service platform dispatch control center selects a CDN node for the client with an IP address of 123.1.13.76, and issues the identity token to this CDN node. The CDN node stores this identity token in the local database.
[0094] 4) The value-added service platform dispatch control center obtains the current timestamp, T auth =1433903295. The first half of the ke...
Embodiment 2
[0118] Embodiment two: replay attack
[0119] 1) The attacker intercepts the normal HTTP request sent by the client of the system through sniffing.
[0120] 2) After a period of time, the attacker uses a replay attack on other client devices to issue a large number of replay requests that are exactly the same as the intercepted request data.
[0121] 3) When the replay request reaches the node, the node checks the timestamp.
[0122] 4) The request time stamp does not meet the time verification rules, and the request is rejected.
Embodiment 3
[0123] Embodiment 3: Client reverse cracking, theft of identity token
[0124] 1) The attacker reverse-engineered the client through decompilation and fully understood the client encryption and decryption process.
[0125] 2) The attacker intercepted the authentication request through sniffing. Since the authentication request uses HTTPS, the attacker cannot obtain the key and the encryption algorithm used.
[0126] 3) The attacker intercepted the HTTP request through sniffing, and obtained the timestamp and the ciphertext of the identity token.
[0127] 4) Since the key is generated by calculating the timestamp according to specific rules, and the algorithm only exists in the control center and nodes, the attacker cannot know the specific rules, so the attacker cannot obtain the key information from the intercepted request.
[0128] 5) The attacker cannot decrypt the ciphertext of the identity token, and the theft of the identity token fails.
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