Trusted computing application method for protecting nuclear power DCS engineer station

Abstract

The invention provides a trusted computing application method for protecting a nuclear power DCS engineer station. According to the method, the active safety defense of the nuclear power DCS engineerstation is realized through the construction of three levels of safety mechanisms, namely, a trusted root function layer, a trusted system function layer and a trusted service function layer. measurable and controllable active security defense of the whole operation process of the nuclear power DCS engineer station is achieved based on trusted computing, known / unknown viruses or APT can be effectively prevented from being predicted, prevented and controlled through the active security defense, and therefore, the defensive performance and defensive reliability of the nuclear power DCS engineerstation are effectively improved.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the technical field of information security protection, in particular to a trusted computing application method for protecting a nuclear power DCS engineer station. Background technique [0002] The nuclear power DCS engineer station plays a vital role in the entire nuclear power control system, but the nuclear power DCS engineer station is vulnerable to malicious code attacks during operation, which brings certain difficulties to the on-site safety maintenance of the nuclear power control system. At the same time, known / unknown viruses or APTs targeting nuclear power control systems emerge in an endless stream, and traditional passive defense methods are difficult to meet the corresponding security requirements. At present, the security protection of most nuclear power DCS engineering stations is mainly composed of three parts: firewall, intrusion detection and virus killing, but the "blocking and killing" method corresponding...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0002] The nuclear power DCS engineer station plays a vital role in the entire nuclear power control system, but the nuclear power DCS engineer station is vulnerable to malicious code attacks during operation, which brings certain difficulties to the on-site safety maintenance of the nuclear power control system

At the same time, known / unknown viruses or APTs targeting nuclear power control systems emerge in endlessly, and traditional passive defense methods are difficult to meet the corresponding security requirements

At present, the security protection of most nuclear power DCS engineering stations is mainly composed of three parts: firewall, intrusion detection and virus killing, but the "blocking and killing" method corresponding to these three parts is difficult to cope with the logic of using nuclear power DCS engineer stations attacks due to flaws, and these three parts also have corresponding security risks

It can be seen that the passive defense methods against malicious codes or viruses in the prior art cannot effectively improve the active security defense capabilities of the nuclear power DCS engineering station

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