Optimal Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Evolutionary Network Game

Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of network security, and particularly relates to a method for selecting an optimal defense strategy based on an evolutionary network game. For this reason, the present invention improves the learning mechanism based on the network topology, establishes the learning object set according to the learning range of the players in the game, uses the Fermi function to calculate the transition probability to the strategy of the learning object, and uses random noise to describe the learning process. The degree of irrational influence, on this basis, build a network attack and defense evolutionary network game model, analyze the evolution process of attack and defense strategies, and solve the evolutionary network game equilibrium. The evolutionary network game model is more in line with the actual network attack and defense, and has good practical guidance value.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention belongs to the field of network security, in particular to a method for selecting an optimal defense strategy based on evolutionary network games. Background technique [0002] At present, network attack and defense presents development trends such as increasingly acute struggle situations, increasingly complex confrontation scenarios, and ever-changing technical means. Especially as cyber attacks become more and more automated and intelligent, their persistence and dynamics gradually increase. Static defense strategies based on matching specific rules and attack signatures cannot effectively deal with frequent and frequent network attacks. Network security is dynamic rather than static. The defense strategy should evolve dynamically with the advancement of the offensive and defensive process, and change with people, time, and situation, so as to maximize the benefits of one's own side under the constraints of resources, capabilities, an...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

However, this assumption is difficult to satisfy in real society, and the rationality of both the attacker and the defender is limited and not complete, which weakens the theoretical value and guiding role of the classic game model

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