Cascading failure multi-stage dynamic game defense method

Abstract

The invention discloses a cascading failure multi-stage dynamic game defense method applied to a power system. The method is characterized by comprising the following steps: firstly setting the total stage number of a game process and initial values of stages of a failure party and a defense party; then generating a deterministic strategy set and a risky strategy set by calculating the probability, the consequence and the risk factor of each action adopted at the stage of a bounded rationality failure party in sequence; stipulating a strategy selection sequence of the bounded rationality failure party; judging whether line overload or power angle instability is caused by the action adopted by the bounded rationality failure party, wherein direct current tide sensitivity-based overload control or extended equal area criterion-based stability control can be selectively adopted by a perfect rationality defense party according to a judgment result; judging whether an ending condition of the game process is met; finally calculating revenue functions of the bounded rationality failure party and the perfect rationality defense party; ending the multi-stage dynamic game defense process. According to the method, the blockage of cascading failure is realized, and power blackout accidents are prevented.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of cascading failure defense control of electric power system, more specifically, it uses game theory to construct a multi-stage dynamic game defense method for cascading failures. Background technique [0002] In recent years, there have been many blackouts caused by cascading faults in domestic and foreign power systems, which have caused huge economic losses and catastrophic consequences. Although these accidents started from accidental initial faults, they need to go through an obvious chain tripping process when they develop into blackouts, during which there is enough time to implement control. For example, in the "8.14" blackout in the United States and Canada in 2003, within 62 minutes after the initial fault occurred, five lines were disconnected one after another. During this period, there were 22 minutes, 9 minutes, 5 minutes and 29 minutes for the dispatching department to take control measures. If the con...

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Problems solved by technology

However, the current cascading failure game defenses are all based on the assumption that the fault party is completely rational, that is, the fault party can always effectively identify and take the disturbance that has the greatest impact on the power grid. In fact, the development process of cascading faults includes a large number of Uncertainty factors, the probability of occurrence of different faults has obvious differences, and there is a certain correlation between faults at the upper and lower levels. Ignoring these factors will cause the strategy set generated by the fault party to be conservative and cannot cover the current operating conditions. The expected failure that the defender should pay most attention to; in addition, the profit function of the game process only considers the amount of system load loss, without considering the cost of control measures, and also ignores the influence of uncertain factors in cascading failures, so it cannot be accurately evaluated Effectiveness of Control Measures

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