Method of constructing multi-dimensional incentive contract under complex task decomposition

Abstract

The invention discloses a method for constructing a multi-dimensional incentive contract under complex task decomposition, the first step is to break down a complex task into a number of simple subtasks, confirming the income function of principal and agent in the case of task decomposition considering the difference of agent 's ability level, secondly, considering the different risk preferences of both parties, the utility function of both parties is determined, and then the agent is encouraged to make the best effort level according to the agent utility function. Finally, based on the participation compatibility constraint and incentive constraint, the optimal fixed reward and variable reward given by the principal to the agent under different sub-tasks are determined. The invention canhelp the principal to encourage the agent to participate in the task for a long time, thereby realizing the maximum utility of the principal.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to the field of user incentives, in particular to an incentive contract construction method considering complex task decomposition under the condition of information asymmetry. Background technique [0002] In the process of task implementation, the information of the entrusting party and the agent is asymmetric, and the agent will reserve its effort to participate in the task based on interest considerations. In addition, there is a problem that the difficulty of the task does not match the ability of the agent. Under such circumstances, how to construct an incentive contract has become a difficult problem for the entrusting party under the premise of ensuring the maximum utility of the entrusting party. At the same time, the agent's risk preference and the client's ability level will also have an impact on the agent's formulation of incentive contracts. [0003] At present, the commonly used incentive contract construction meth...

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Problems solved by technology

The signal transmission model and signal discrimination model in the principal-agent theory are mainly used. The signal transmission model, in consideration of information asymmetry, encourages the agent to make the best effort through the construction of the contract, while ensuring the maximum benefit of the principal , but did not consider the influence of the agent's ability level on the principal's income and the agent's efforts; the signal discrimination model made up for the shortcomings of the signal transmission model, taking into account the agent's ability level, but did not take into account the task difficulty and the agent's ability mismatch problem

[0006] At the same time, the above incentive contract construction methods do not take into account the influence of the attitudes of the principal and the agent to risks on the principal's utility level and the agent's effort level in the case of task decomposition, which will lead to theoretical methods that do not conform to the actual incentive environment, thus Inability to optimize incentives

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